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This paper reviews and summarises a variety of research studies into the nature of design 
ability. Six aspects of design ability are identified: coping with ill-defined problems, 
problem structuring, managing goals and constraints, generating solution concepts, 
thinking by drawing, and intuitive reasoning. 
D ESIGNING is SOMETHING that people do. Animals do not do it, and machines (so far) do not do it. The ability to design is 
a part of human intelligence, and that ability is 
natural and widespread amongst the human po-
pulation. We human beings have a long history 
of design ability, and it is only necessary to refer 
to the many examples of vernacular design and 
traditional craftwork to appreciate that design 
ability used to be somehow a collective or shared 
ability. In modern, industrial society, it appears 
that some people have their design ability more 
highly-developed than other people - either 
through some genetic endowment or through 
social and educational development. In fact, 
some people are very good at designing. 
Research in Design Ability 
For at least thirty years there has been a slow but 
steady growth in our understanding of design 
ability - the pioneering research paper in this 
field is perhaps the study of engineering desig-
ners by Marples (1960). Research methods that 
have been used have included the following: 
• Interviews with designers 
These have usually been with designers who are 
acknowledged as having well-developed design 
ability, and have usually been unstructured in-
terviews which sought to obtain these designers' 
reflections on the processes and procedures they 
use - either in general, or with reference to par-
ticular works of design. 
• Observations and case studies 
These have usually been focused on one particu-
lar design project at a time, with observers re-
cording the progress and development of the 
project either contemporaneously or post-hoc. 
Both participant and non-participant observa-
tion methods have been included, and both real 
and artificially-constructed design projects have 
been studied. 
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• Protocol studies 
This more formal method has usually been app-
lied to artificial projects, because of the stringent 
requirements of recording the protocols - the 
'thinking-aloud' and associated actions of sub-
jects asked to perform a set design task. Both in-
experienced (usually student) designers and ex-
perienced designers have been studied in this 
way. 
• Controlled tests 
By these I mean the kinds of tests conducted 
under controlled, laboratory conditions, in which 
subjects are required to perform a specialised 
task, and data on their performance is recorded 
and analysed. The models for these kinds of tests 
are the controlled laboratory studies of psycho-
logy research. There are relatively few controlled 
tests in design research. 
• Simulation trials 
A relatively new development in research metho-
dology has been the attempt to simulate human 
thinking through artificial intelligence techni-
ques. There are as yet few examples of this 
method being used in design research. Although 
AI techniques may be meant to supplant human 
thinking, research in AI can also be a means of 
trying to understand human thinking. 
• Reflection and theorising 
As well as the empirical research methods listed 
above, there has been a modest history in design 
research of theoretical analysis and reflection 
upon the nature of design ability. 
We therefore have a varied set of methods 
which have been used for researching design 
ability. The set ranges from the more abstract to 
the more concrete types of investigation, and 
from the more close to the more distant study of 
actual design practice. The studies themselves 
have ranged over naive or non-designers, through 
inexperienced or student designers, to experi-
enced and expert designers, and even on to forms 
of non-human, artificial intelligence. 
Aspects of Design Abi l i ty 
1. Ill-defined problems 
What I would like to do in this paper is to show 
how the more scientific and/or reflective re-
search studies tend to confirm the more intuitive 
statements made by designers themselves. Let 
me start with a quotation which I think is quite 
well known in architectural circles, a comment 
by the architect, Denys Lasdun (1972): 
Our job is to give the client, on time and on 
cost, not what he wants, but what he never 
dreamed he wanted; and when he gets it, he 
recognizes it as something he wanted all the 
time. 
At first sight, this seems to be a rather arrogant 
statement by an architect who is prepared to 
over-ride 'what the client wants' because the 
architect 'knows better'. I prefer to see itmore as 
reflecting a view that 'the problem' ('what the 
client wants') is ill-defined, and the designer 
finds it necessary to go beyond the problem 
statement in developing a solution that is some-
thing more than merely an adequate response to 
'the problem'. In designing, 'the solution' does 
not arise directly from 'the problem'; the de-
signer's attention oscillates, or commutes, bet-
ween the two, and an understanding of both gra-
dually develops, as Archer ( 1979) has suggested: 
The first thing to recognize is that "the pro-
blem" in a design problem, like any other ill-
defined problem, is not the statement of re-
quirements. Nor is "the solution" the means 
ultimately arrived at to meet those require-
ments. "The problem" is obscurity about the 
requirements, the practicability of envisage-
able provisions and/or misfit between the re-
quirements and the provisions. "The solution" 
is a requirement/provision match that contains 
an acceptably small amount of residual misfit 
and obscurity. Thus the relationship between 
design problem and design requirements and 
design provision lies along one axis and the 
relationship between design problem and de-
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sign solution lies along another axis. The de-
sign activity is commutative, the designer's 
attention oscillating between the emerging re-
quirement ideas and the developing provision 
ideas, as he illuminates obscurity on both sides 
and reduces misfit between them. 
Research studies have confirmed that designers' 
cognitive strategies for problem-solving are based 
upon their need to resolve ill-defined problems. 
For example, Thomas and Carroll (1979) carried 
out several observational and protocol studies of 
a variety of problem-solving tasks, including de-
sign tasks. One of their findings was that de-
signers' behaviour was characterised by their 
treating the set problems as though they were i l l -
defined problems, even when they could also be 
treated as well-defined problems, for example 
by changing the goals and constraints. Thomas 
and Carroll concluded that: 
Design is a type of problem solving in which 
the problem solver views the problem or acts 
as though there is some ill-definedness in the 
goals, initial conditions or allowable transfor-
mations. 
2. Problem structuring 
The ill-defined nature of design problems means 
that they cannot be solved simply by collecting 
and synthesing information, as the architect Ric-
hard MacCormac (1976) has observed: 
I don't think you can design anything just by 
absorbing information and then hoping to 
synthesise it into a solution. What you need to 
know about the problem only becomes apparent 
as you're trying to solve it. 
In early observational studies of urban designers 
and planners, Levin (1966) realised that they 
'added information' to the problem as given, 
simply in order to make a resolution of the pro-
blem possible. Levin saw this as like adding a 
'missing ingredient': 
The designer knows (consciously or uncon-
sciously) that some ingredient must be added 
to the information that he already has in order 
to arrive at an unique solution. This knowledge 
is in itself not enough in design problems, of 
course. He has to look for the extra ingredient, 
and he uses his powers of conjecture and ori-
ginal thought to do so. 
Since 'the problem' cannot be fully understood 
in isolation from consideration of 'the solution', 
it is natural that solution conjectures should be 
used as a means of helping to explore and under-
stand the problem formulation. This was recog-
nized by Marples (1960) from his observations 
of engineering designers, although it was also 
clear that the designers were not necessarily 
adept at generating several alternative solutions 
in order to expand their search space. Marples 
commented that: 
The nature of the problem can only be found by 
examining it through proposed solutions, and 
it seems likely that its examination through 
one, and only one, proposal gives a very biased 
view. It seems probable that at least two radi-
cally different solutions need to be attempted 
in order to get, through comparisons of sub-
problems, a clear picture of the "real nature" of 
the problem. 
Designers tend to move rapidly to early solution 
conjectures, and use these conjectures as a way 
of exploring and defining problem-and-solution 
together. This is not a strategy employed by all 
problem-solvers, many of whom attempt to define 
or understand the problem fully before making 
solution attempts. This difference in cognitive 
strategies was observed by Lawson (1979), in 
his controlled tests of problem-solving behaviour 
in which he compared scientists with architects: 
The scientists were [attempting to] discover 
the structure of the problem; the architects 
were proceeding by generating a sequence of 
high-scoring solutions until one proved accept-
able... [The scientists] operated what might be 
called a problem-focussing strategy ... archi-
tects by contrast adopted a solution-focussing 
strategy. 
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3. Goals and constraints 
The slipperiness of the relationship between pro-
blem and solution in designing is also conveyed 
in the comments of the furniture designer Geoff-
rey Harcourt (Davies, 1985), discussing how a 
particular design emerged: 
As a matter of fact, the solution that I came up 
with wasn't a solution to the problem at all. I 
never saw it as that... But when the chair was 
actually put together [it] in a way quite well 
solved the problem, but from a completely dif-
ferent angle, a completely different point of 
view. 
Designers do not, therefore, work by a method of 
'conjectures and refutations'; their solution 
conjectures are studied to see if they can be con-
firmed, rather than refuted. This behaviour was 
observed in an early protocol study of architects 
by Eastman (1970), who found that: 
One approach to the problem was consistently 
expressed in all protocols. Instead of generating 
abstract relationships and attributes, then deri-
ving the appropriate object to be considered, 
the subjects always generated a design ele-
ment and then determined its qualities. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Darke 
(1979) from her interviews with successful archi-
tects. In discussing particular designs, she saw 
that they had all used solution conjectures early 
in the design process, as a means of narrowing 
the solution space: 
The greatest variety reduction or narrowing 
down of the range of solutions occurs early on 
in the design process, with a conjecture or con-
ceptualization of a possible solution. Further 
understanding of the problem is gained by 
testing this conjectured solution. 
Darke also concluded that the architects had all 
found, generated or imposed particular strong 
constraints, or narrow sets of objectives, upon 
the problem, in order to help generate the early 
solution concept. These constraints and objectives 
are the 'missing ingredient' of Levin; Darke 
called them the 'primary generators' of the so-
lution concepts. 
Problem goals and constraints are not sacro-
sanct, and designers exercise the freedom to 
change goals and constraints during solution ge-
neration, as understanding of the problem deve-
lops and definition of the solution proceeds. This 
was a feature of designer behaviour noted by 
Akin (1979) from his protocol studies: 
One of the unique aspects of design behaviour 
is the constant generation of new task goals 
and redefinition of task constraints. 
An early case study of the design of a school, by 
Krauss and Myer (1970), had also noted this be-
haviour. They reported how one particular ele-
ment - the school music room - was shifted 
around in its location in the plan, as the designers 
changed goals and constraints during the process 
of designing: 
For example, it moved south to take advantage 
of a dip in the site which permits it to have a 
greater volume, to get more sun, to have a dis-
tinctive view, and to be near the entry and cir-
culation focus. Note that the designers have 
dropped one constraint: they no longer consi-
der it necessary for the music room to be near 
the major play area. They have added other 
constraints: the music room should have a pro-
minent location and greater volume. In other 
words, the designers are dropping old concerns 
and raising new ones, and they even change 
their minds again as they create forms and 
' react to them. 
4. Solution concepts 
Although designers change goals and constraints 
as they design, they hang on to their major solu-
tion concept for as long as possible, even when 
detailed development of the scheme throws up 
difficult problems. Part of the changing of goals 
and constraints is associated with resolving such 
difficulties without having to start again with a 
major new concept. 
From his case studies of architectural design, 
Rowe (1987) observed that: 
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A dominant influence is exerted by initial 
design ideas on subsequent problem-solving 
directions ... Even when severe problems are 
encountered, a considerable effort is made to 
make the initial idea work, rather than to stand 
back and adopt a fresh point of departure. 
This aspect of designer behaviour is also evident 
in engineering design. It may be viewed nega-
tively as evidence of designers adjusting goals 
and constraints in order to make their solution 
concepts' work', or more positively as a learning 
experience for the designer, which is inevitable 
in resolving ill-defined problems. The latter view 
is taken by Waldron and Waldron (1988), in their 
comments on an engineering design case study: 
The premises that were used in initial concept 
generation often proved, on subsequent in-
vestigation, to be wholly or partly fallacious. 
Nevertheless, they provided a necessary start-
ing point. The process can be viewed as inhe-
rently self-correcting, since later work tends to 
clarify and correct earlier work. 
5. Thinking by drawing 
The principal working method that designers use 
in their work is, of course, the sketch drawing. 
They use this method in a form of simultaneous 
drawing-and-thinking. For example, the engi-
neering designer, Jack Howe (Davies, 1985) 
said that, when his design thinking gets 'stuck', 
I draw something. Even if it's "potty", I draw 
it. The act of drawing seems to clarify my 
thoughts. 
Schon's (1983) more recent observational studies 
of design tutors have also reinforced the central 
role of drawing as a modelling language of de-
sign, and of the way solution-and-problem are 
explored together through this medium. Accor-
ding to Schon, this exploration is almost con-
versational between the external representation 
and the designer's internal cognitive model of 
the problem-and-solution: 
[The designer] shapes the situation, in accor-
dance with his initial appreciation of it; the 
situation "talks back", and he responds to the 
back-talk. 
6. Intuitive reasoning 
When talking about design and design proces-
ses, designers often referto the role of 'intuition' 
in their reasoning processes. Jack Howe com-
mented: 
I believe in intuition. I think that's the differ-
ence between a designer and an engineer... I 
make a distinction between engineers and engi-
neering designers... An engineering designer 
is just as creative as any other sort of designer. 
Similarly, the industrial designer Richard Stevens 
has commented on the role of intuition in en-
gineering design and industrial design (Davies, 
1985): 
A lot of engineering design is intuitive, based 
on subjective thinking. But an engineer is un-
happy doing this. An engineer wants to test; 
test and measure. He's been brought up this 
way and he's unhappy if he can't prove some-
thing. Whereas an industrial designer, with his 
Art School training, is entirelt happy making 
judgements whiah are intuitive. 
Several theoretical arguments have been advan-
ced in support of the view that design reasoning 
is different from the conventionally-acknow-
ledged forms of inductive and deductive reaso-
ning. For example, March (1976) distinguished 
design's mode of reasoning from those of logic 
and science: 
Logic has interests in abstract forms. Science 
investigates extant forms. Design initiates no-
vel forms. A scientific hypothesis is not the 
same thing as a design hypothesis. A logical 
proposition is not to be mistaken for a design 
proposal. A speculative design cannot be de-
termined logically, because the mode of reaso-
ning involved is essentially abductive. 
March drew upon the work of the philosopher 
Peirce in identifying the appropriate mode of 
reasoning as 'abductive' in character. March 
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himself preferred to use the term 'productive' 
reasoning for that type of thinking which produces 
a design proposal, but several other authors have 
taken up and developed the idea of 'abductive' 
thinking as being a key element of design reaso-
ning. The important point is that design reaso-
ning is understood as characteristic to itself, and 
that inappropriate modes of reaoning should not 
be forced upon it. The distinction between de-
sign reasoning and scientific reasoning, for ex-
ample, has also been made by Simon (1969), on 
the basis that: 
The natural sciences are concerned with how 
things are... Design, on the other hand, is con-
cerned with how things ought to be. 
Conclusion 
I have attempted to show that there is a reason-
able history of research into the nature of design 
ability, with some some consistent patterns in the 
results upon which we can base our understand-
ing of how designers think and work. At the mo-
ment, we seem to have a fairly rich picture of 
design ability, but we lack a successful, simpli-
fying paradigm. Those simplifying paradigms 
which have been attempted in the past - such as 
viewing design as problem-solving, or informa-
tion-processing, or decision-making, or pattern-
recognition - have failed to capture the full com-
plexity of design ability. The lack of an adequate, 
simplifying paradigm is perhaps something 
which inhibits the transfer of knowledge from 
research into practice and education. There is 
therefore a strong case for basing any further 
developments in design theory and methodo-
logy on the foundations which have been laid in 
understanding design ability, and I hope that this 
paper has shown where those foundations are. 
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